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David Wettstein and Ori Zax
 
''Promotion Policies of Workers who Observe their Ability''
( 2018, Vol. 38 No.4 )
 
 
We analyze promotion policy when workers are privately informed regarding their abilities at the outset of their careers. We show that the resulting equilibrium outcomes coincide with the outcomes derived in the standard promotion framework where workers and firms do not possess private information at the start of their relationship (Waldman 1984).
 
 
Keywords: promotions, job ladders
JEL: M5 - Personnel Economics: General
 
Manuscript Received : Nov 04 2018 Manuscript Accepted : Dec 27 2018

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