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Amitrajeet A. Batabyal and Hamid Beladi
 
''A game-theoretic model of sexual harassment''
( 2020, Vol. 40 No.2 )
 
 
We focus on the interaction between a male employee and his supervisor and analyze a game-theoretic model of sexual harassment in the workplace. The male employee is accused of sexually harassing a female employee and the supervisor's task is to gather evidence and then determine whether to legally charge the male employee with sexual harassment. The evidence gathering process is random and concrete evidence is available to the supervisor with probability one-half. Our analysis of this strategic interaction leads to four results. First, we delineate the game in extensive form. Second, we specify the matrix that represents the normal form of the extensive form. Third, we show that there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game between the male employee and his supervisor. Finally, we show that there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the same male employee-supervisor game.
 
 
Keywords: Game, Mixed-Strategy, Sexual Harassment, Workplace
JEL: J7 - Labor Discrimination: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Dec 19 2019 Manuscript Accepted : May 09 2020

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