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Kojun Hamada
 
''Mixed duopoly in quantity competition under the optimal privatization rate''
( 2020, Vol. 40 No.1 )
 
 
This study examines a mixed duopoly in differentiated products in which a partially privatized firm and a private firm simultaneously or sequentially compete in quantity after the government sets the optimal degree of privatization for the partially privatized firm. Comparing the social welfare when the timing of decision making is different, we present the following results. First, social welfare in Cournot equilibrium is equal to that in the Stackelberg equilibrium when a partially privatized firm is the leader. Second, social welfare is the largest in the Stackelberg equilibrium when a partially privatized firm is the follower.
 
 
Keywords: mixed duopoly, partial privatization, quantity competition, Stackelberg equilibrium
JEL: L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jan 29 2020 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 05 2020

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