All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

Naoki Matsumoto and Masaki Minegishi
''Sufficient conditions for the existence of stable sets of cooperative games''
( 2020, Vol. 40 No.3 )
In 1944, von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced a stable set of $n$-person cooperative games in characteristic function form, with transferable utility (called TU-games for short), which is the first solution concept for cooperative games with at least three players. It is known that every $n$-person game has a stable set if $n in {3,4}$. On the other hand, Lucas constructed a 10-person TU-game which has no stable set. However, for $5 leq n leq 9$, it is not known whether every $n$-person TU-game has a stable set. In this paper, we show two sufficient conditions for an $n$-person TU-game to have a stable set for any $ngeq 5$.
Keywords: Cooperative game; TU-game, Stable set.
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
Manuscript Received : May 04 2020 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 14 2020

  This abstract has been downloaded 118 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 125735 times