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Etienne Redor and Magnus Blomkvist
''Do all inside and affiliated directors hold the same value for shareholders?''
( 2021, Vol. 41 No.3 )
In this paper, we re-question the value of board independence for shareholders. Instead of studying the relationship between the proportion of independent directors and firm performance (as in previous studies), we analyse how shareholders perceive board independence by examining the relations between director independence and shareholder satisfaction as measured by shareholder voting outcomes in annual director elections. This approach allows us to overcome concerns about omitted firm-level characteristics and to propose a finer analysis of the value of board independence/affiliation for shareholders. We show (1) that independent directors receive significantly more, and inside directors significantly fewer, ‘for' votes in director elections than other board members, (2) that not all inside and affiliated directors hold the same value for shareholders and (3) that the leadership structure matters to shareholders.
Keywords: Inside directors, Outside directors, Affiliated directors, Director independence, Board of directors, Shareholder satisfaction, Leadership structure, Duality, Dual CEO structure, Agency theory, Stewardship theory, Resource dependence theory, Director election,
JEL: G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Manuscript Received : Jun 29 2020 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 18 2021

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