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Chihiro Morooka
 
''Inefficiency in alternately repeated coordination games with dynastic preferences''
( 2020, Vol. 40 No.4 )
 
 
This study investigates a specific model of alternately repeated pure coordination games with overlapping generations, where the one-shot game has multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. We consider the case in which the payoff of each player is affected by the outcome after his retirement as well as the outcome during his participation. Unlike the preceding results on alternately repeated coordination games where only the Pareto-efficient outcome is obtained in equilibria, we show that an inefficient equilibrium arises in our model.
 
 
Keywords: Overlapping Generations Games, Alternating Moves, Coordination Games, Dynastic Preferences, Inefficiency.
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming: General
 
Manuscript Received : Oct 19 2020 Manuscript Accepted : Dec 06 2020

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