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David Lu
''A Possible Perverse Effect of Favoritism in Asymmetric Competitions''
( 2021, Vol. 41 No.3 )
In this paper, we show that in an incomplete-information all pay auction, favoring the weaker player can perversely reduce his/her winning chance, compared to the case of standard all pay auction without favoritism. Thus, favoritism towards the weaker may not increase the winner diversity.
Keywords: All pay auction, Favoritism, Incomplete information, Winner diversity.
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Manuscript Received : Jul 10 2021 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 18 2021

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