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| Alexandre Carbonnel |
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| ''Can foreclosure benefit consumers? The case of innovation in new markets'' |
| ( 2021, Vol. 41 No.3 ) |
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| Innovation concerns have been at the core of some recent horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. This has led to a growing literature that has specifically focused on horizontal mergers. In this paper, I show that foreclosure may benefit consumers in non-horizontal mergers when firms compete to innovate in a new market. This is because it may allow consumers to benefit from an innovation to which they would not have access to in the absence of foreclosure. I determine the conditions leading to this conclusion and argue that a cautious approach to foreclosure by competition authorities is warranted when firms compete to innovate in a new market. |
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| Keywords: Mergers, foreclosure, innovation |
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
K2 - Regulation and Business Law: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Sep 17 2021 | | Manuscript Accepted : Sep 17 2021 |
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