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Hidekazu Anno and Sui Takahashi
 
''A decomposition of strategy-proofness in discrete resource allocation problems''
( 2022, Vol. 0 No.0 )
 
 
This note provides a characterization of strategy-proofness in discrete resource allocation problems. Based on it, we establish a theorem that has the following two corollaries: (i) the student-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA) rule for college admission problems is strategy-proof for students and (ii) the top-trading cycles (TTC) rule for housing markets is strategy-proof.
 
 
Keywords: Market design, Two-sided matching market, Indivisible goods allocation problem, Core, Strategy-proofness
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
 
Manuscript Received : Oct 18 2021 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 20 2022

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