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Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Devashish Mitra
 
''Heterogeneous capital ownership, partial democracy and political support for immigration''
( 2024, Vol. 44 No.4 )
 
 
This paper analyzes and compares equilibrium immigration levels of some popular political economy models in the context of unequal capital holdings. We show that immigration rises (falls) with inequality in a limited (inclusive) democracy where only a small (large) fraction of the population has voting rights. Furthermore, we highlight the similarities between a campaign contributions model and a partial democracy model in terms of their predictions about immigration policy. In particular, we show that extension of voting rights in a partial democracy has qualitatively similar implications on immigration policy as reducing the relative weight on campaign contributions.
 
 
Keywords: Legal immigration policy, Inequality in capital ownership, Partial democracy, Voter support for immigration, Campaign contributions, Lobbying.
JEL: F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business: General
J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: General
 
Manuscript Received : Oct 18 2024 Manuscript Accepted : Dec 30 2024

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