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Sep 18 2021 David Lu
  A Possible Perverse Effect of Favoritism in Asymmetric Competitions
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Preliminary Result
 
Jun 02 2020 Yizhaq Minchuk
  Rent-seeking contest with two forms of sabotaging efforts
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Nov 09 2016 Sung-chi Lin , Hsiao-chi Chen and Shi-miin Liu
  Does Asymmetry or Incomplete Information on Firms' Costs Yield Spatial Agglomeration?
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Preliminary Result
 
Nov 21 2015 Hironori Otsubo
  Nash Equilibria in a Two-Person Discrete All-Pay Auction with Unfair Tie-Break and Complete Information
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Mar 11 2015 Srobonti Chattopadhyay and Tarun Kabiraj
  Incomplete information and R&D organization
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Jun 18 2014 Christian Klamler
  How risky is it to manipulate a scoring rule under incomplete information?
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Jan 30 2012 Mohamed Jeddy and Bruno Larue
  Multiplicity of Equilibria in Multi-Unit Demand Sequential Auctions under Complete Information
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Dec 02 2010 Sonia Schwartz
  Pollution Permit Market: Using Incentive Contracts to Reduce Dominant Firm Inefficiencies
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Nov 15 2010 Takanori Adachi
  Endogenous participation costs and equilibrium abstention in voting with complete information: A three-player case
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Mar 11 2010 Slim Ben Youssef
  Adoption of a cleaner technology by a monopoly under incomplete information
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Feb 02 2010 Mohamed Jeddy , Bruno Larue and Jean-philippe Gervais
  Allocations and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions under Complete Information with Symmetric Bidders
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Aug 13 2009 Philippe Delacote and Lydie Ancelot
  Prosecutor and lawyers in plea bargaining with complete information
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Preliminary Result
 
Jul 16 2009 Tin-chun Lin
  Application of a static game of complete information: economic behaviors of professors and students
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Sep 04 2008 Ismail Saglam
  A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Jun 20 2007 Jeremy Bertomeu
  On the existence of an equilibrium in the Split-the-Difference Mechanism over an uncountable set with a singular part
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Comment
 
May 30 2007 Ismail Saglam
  A Unified Theory of Implementation
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Apr 08 2007 Ismail Saglam and Semih Koray
  Learning in Bayesian regulation: desirable or undesirable?
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Apr 06 2006 Nicolas Sahuguet
  Caps in asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Sep 23 2005 Gwenael Piaser
  Stochastic and deterministic menus in common agency games
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Jan 22 2005 Jihong Lee
  Incomplete Information, Renegotiation, and Breach of Contract
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
May 24 2004 Slim Ben Youssef
  Transboundary pollution, asymmetric information and social welfare
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Jan 17 2004 Takanori Adachi
  Costly participation in voting and equilibrium abstention: a uniqueness result
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note
 
Jan 18 2002 Xiaopeng Xu
  The effect of the status quo tie-breaking rule on prize winning
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note