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Dec 06 2020 Chihiro Morooka
  Inefficiency in alternately repeated coordination games with dynastic preferences
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Jan 21 2018 Francisco JM Costa and Joisa Dutra
  Effort Complementarity and Team Size, An Experimental Analysis of Moral Hazard in Teams
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Preliminary Result
 
Jun 11 2016 Jiabin Wu
  Evolving assortativity and social conventions
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Nov 21 2015 Tomohiko Tomohiko
  Network Heterogeneity and a Coordination Game
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Preliminary Result
 
Jul 27 2010 Aric P. Shafran
  Interdependent security experiments
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Preliminary Result
 
Jun 10 2010 Giovanna Devetag and Andreas Ortmann
  Classic coordination failures revisited: the effects of deviation costs and loss avoidance
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Mar 25 2010 David Kelsey and Wei Pang
  How productive is optimism? the Impact of ambiguity on the "big push"
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Aug 26 2009 Daisuke Oyama and Satoru Takahashi
  Monotone and local potential maximizers in symmetric 3x3 supermodular games
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Oct 06 2005 Giorgio Fagiolo
  A Note on Equilibrium Selection in Polya-Urn Coordination Games
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Mar 29 2005 Andrew Wait and Vladimir Smirnov
  Coordination games and the option to wait
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Mar 09 2005 Thierry Vignolo
  When envy helps explain coordination
  Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Preliminary Result
 
Oct 28 2004 Suren Basov
  Equilibrium selection in coordination games: Why do dominated strategies matter?
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