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Toshiji Kawagoe and Hirokazu Takizawa
 
''An experimental study of e-mail games with strategic information transmission and communication cost''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.4 )
 
 
We experimentally examined several versions of Rubinstein (1989)'s e-mail game in the laboratory. He shows that, in the unique equilibrium of this game, players behave as if no information is exchanged, no matter how many messages are successfully sent. This has been regarded as a "paradox of almost common knowledge." Binmore and Samuelson (2001) later extended Rubinstein's model by replacing automatic information transmission with the strategic one, or by introducing communication costs. We test these theories in the laboratory experiment. In general, our experimental results fail to provide support for Binmore and Samuelson's prediction. While they predict that those changes will induce players to take heed of the exchanged messages, our experimental results show little evidences to support their predictions and contradictory results in some cases.
 
 
Keywords: E-mail game, almost common knowledge, experiment
JEL: C9 - Design of Experiments: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Description of Appendix:

A sample of the instructions in the experiment (attention cost case).
EB-12-00490-Appendix.pdf
 
 
Manuscript Received : Jun 27 2012 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 22 2012

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