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### Minorities and Political Success

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#### Abstract

In this paper, we focus on the effect of belonging to one or more minority groups on the probability of success in primary elections. We use a unique dataset of candidates in Israeli primaries. Our main finding is that belonging to one minority group decreases the probability of winning; however, belonging to two minority groups increases the probability of winning. Thus, being a new immigrant, a woman or a Muslim decreases the chances of electoral success (relative to a native male); however, a candidate who is a woman and a new immigrant, for example, has an advantage in the race. In some cases of candidates belonging to two minority groups, their chances of success are not only higher than for a candidate from one minority group, but also than for a candidate from the majority.

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## 1. Introduction

In the worldwide political arena, immigrants and ethnic groups have low representation (see, for example, Dancygier et al., 2015). For instance, the share of ethnic minorities in Australia is 6%, but the share of ethnic minorities in the parliament is only 0.7%. In Germany, ethnic minorities make up 8.5% of the population, but only 0.8% are chosen to the parliament. In Switzerland, 6% of the population belongs to minority groups, but these groups have no political representation (for additional examples, see Bird, 2003).

The literature offers a variety of explanations for the under-representation of minorities in politics. One is the effect of ethnic groups' socioeconomic factors, such as income and education level, on electoral participation and representation: immigrants and ethnic groups tend to have lower incomes and less education than natives, and their political representation is therefore low. Another explanation is the influence of the party system or election method on minority representatives (Sass and Mehay, 2003). Van der Zwan and Lubbers (2016) found that a party's characteristics, i.e., its stance on integration and migration, can explain the share of ethnic candidates. Some explanations focus on supply- and demand-side factors. On the supply side, minorities may be discriminated against in the selection process and face obstacles to becoming candidates in the first place. On the demand side, minorities may be discriminated against by voters, limiting their success to just a few areas with large minority populations (Heath et al., 2015).

The representation of immigrants and ethnic groups in parliaments has significant implications on the local population as well as on the immigrants. There is evidence in the literature of the political exclusion of ethnic minorities contributing to riots, such as those occurring with the politically marginalized immigrant groups in France, Belgium and Great Britain (Dancygier et al., 2015). Sass and Mehay (2003) found that when the share of black representatives on a city council increases, the percentage of black police recruits increases as well.

The immigrant's socioeconomic background is different from that of the local population. This may affect not only political representation but also immigrants' voting patterns. Using data from Norway, Bergh and Bjørklund (2011) showed that voters who belong to minority groups are, on average, younger and poorer than the rest of the voters. Moreover, the share of females among minority voters was higher than that among the rest and the minorities tended to reside disproportionately in the city of Oslo. These socioeconomic differences explained, in part, the minorities' support for left-of-center parties. They found that the main factor is 'ethnic voting', i.e., immigrants support candidates who have the same ethnicity as themselves. Most minority candidates are on left-of-center party ballots, so this contributes to immigrants' voting for these parties. Heath et al. (2015) studied whether religion affects voting, using data from India. They also found that Muslims are indeed more likely to vote for Muslim candidates, but only when those candidates have a realistic chance of winning—there was thus a strong strategic element to their vote calculus.

Bird (2003) showed that a historical link to the party strongly affects minority voting, even when the party fails to advance the material and political interests of the group. Examples of this are African-Americans voting overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party or Blacks in Britain voting overwhelmingly for the Labour Party. The allegiance of ethnic groups to particular political parties enables them to exert

some influence over those parties, especially in local areas where they are highly concentrated.

Another group which has low representation in politics is women. There are many reasons for this phenomenon: parties may field fewer women than men because of a male-dominant power structure; women could be less interested in participating in politics (also because of a male-dominated environment); voters may be biased and therefore prefer to vote for men (see Bonomi et al., 2013). Htun (2004) showed that about 50 democracies allocate political party access to women and ethnic groups. Women tend to receive candidate quotas in political parties, whereas ethnic groups are granted reserved seats in legislatures.

It makes sense that women who belong to minority groups face multiple forms of exclusion from political representation. Holmsten et al. (2010) explored the representation of women in ethnic parties. They counted the number of reasons why ethnic minorities might exclude women. First, the relatively smaller size of the ethnic parties could result in exclusion of women. Second, the subcultures of many ethnic minorities are often more patriarchal than the majority culture, and thus parties representing such groups may include fewer women. Finally, an ideological fixation on ethnicity within ethnic parties may marginalize subminorities within the target group. Surprisingly, they found that ethnic parties do not appear to elect a lower percentage of women than non-ethnic parties, except religious ethnic parties which were significantly less likely to elect women than other ethnic parties.

Recent literature exploring the representation of ethnic women in parliaments in European countries that allow immigration shows that ethnic minority women sometimes outnumber ethnic minority men in national parliaments (for example, Celis et al., 2014; Dancygier et al., 2015). A possible explanation for this is that ethnic minority women in these European countries are more often selected than men because their profile complements that of white male incumbent candidates. Another explanation is that ethnic minority women help parties meet the demands of gender parity while also reinforcing secular norms against growing ethnic and religious tensions (see Mügge, 2016).

In this article, we study how belonging to an ethnic group or a religious group, or being female affects the probability of success in primary elections. We contribute to the emerging literature on minorities' and women's representation in a few ways. First, we examine the combination of belonging to a religious group and an ethnic group simultaneously, and not only that of a woman belonging to an ethnic group as in other articles. Second, our unique data enable us to control for many variables, such as age, experience, profession, military background, etc. Third, we study the representation of women in religious groups in the main parties in the Israeli elections rather than only in ethnic parties as in some other studies.

## **2. Empirical Evidence**

### **2.1. Background**

The electoral system in Israel is based on proportional representation. The whole country serves as a single electoral district in which all 120 members are elected, based on a closed-list system. The legal threshold increased from 2% in the 2013 election to 3.25% in the 2015 election (Diskin and Hazan, 2014). The Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) included 14 parties in 2015 (before the election), with the two main parties being Likud and Labor. Likud is traditionally the most important

party of the right-wing bloc while Labor leads the left-wing bloc. In principle, elections are held every 4 years, but in December 2014, less than 2 years after the government was sworn in, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decided to dissolve the Parliament and hold early elections in March 2015.

In Israel, many of the parties represent particular ethnic and religious minority groups. Hadash, Balad, and Ra'am/Ta'al are Arab-supported parties, and Israel Beiteinu ("Israel Our Home" in Hebrew) is heavily supported by immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Bayit Yehudi is a religious party. United Torah Judaism and Shas are ultra-religious (Orthodox - Haredim) parties distinguished mainly by ethnic backgrounds (Diskin and Hazan, 2014): while the former applies to the ultra-religious Jews from Europe, Shas applies to the old immigrants from Asia–Africa and their second and third generations (Mizrahim) who feel wronged. Nevertheless, the biggest parties also appeal to voters who belong to religious and ethnic minority groups (Hazan and Rahat, 2000).

Until the 1990s, most of the candidates for the Parliament (Knesset) were chosen by a small group of party leaders (central committee). Today the two main parties, Likud and Labor, and two additional parties, Bayit Yehudi and Meretz ("Energy" in Hebrew) choose their candidates for Parliament via primaries. Party primaries, in their broadest form, allow a party's membership at large to participate in the process of selecting its representatives. In Israel, only dues-paying party members are allowed to vote in their party primaries, as opposed to open primaries where any voter can participate in the selection of nominees of any party. Israel has no laws pertaining to primaries, apart from their financing, leaving each party free to adopt primaries if it wishes, and to use whichever form of primary it sees fit (Hazan, 1997). The number of party members in the Likud is about 100,000, and about 70,000 (each in Labor and Bayit Yehudi). In Meretz, the number of party members is only about 1,000 and their method of choosing representatives is different from the other parties; Meretz is therefore not investigated in this paper.

The primaries for Likud, Labor and the Bayit Yehudi include a “reserved place” mechanism which guarantees minimal positions to distinct sectors or social groups on the party’s Parliament list. The candidates running for these reserved positions compete against all other candidates; the reserved representation mechanism is implemented only if the candidates do not attain the reserved position, or a higher one, on their own. For example, if 1 in every 10 positions on the party list is reserved for a woman but none of the top 10 candidates in the party primary are women, the highest positioned woman candidate will be “bumped” into one of the first 10 positions on the party’s list. This mechanism is used to ensure the representation of women (in all of these parties), non-Jews and new immigrants (Likud and Labor) and one young candidate (Likud). The Labor also ensures that there will be candidates from different districts, while in the Likud the candidates from the different districts are elected in a separate list and those places are only open to non-incumbent candidates. Usually the “reserved place” of the part districts are located at the back of the list with a low probability of getting into parliament. A candidate who wins a high place in the primaries will win a seat in the Parliament based on the proportional votes received by his or her party in the national election (Hazan, 1997). Notethat sometimes, parties run together or merge, for example, Likud and Israel Beiteinu in the 2013 election and Labor and Hatnuah ("The Movement" in Hebrew) in the 2015 election. In this situation, the position of the candidates in the united party differs from their position in their original party.

In the 2015 election, the parties rules enabled the leaders to join the party candidates who did not gain a place or succeed in the primaries, but can contribute to the party. This provides a way of fixing the results of insufficiently represented minority groups in the primaries. It is interesting to see that the leaders prefer candidates who belong to double minority groups. The Likud's leader, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, joined a candidate who is female and second generation to immigrants from Asia. The Labor leader joined a woman who is also a new immigrant. The leader of the religious party Bayit Yehudi tried to join a candidate who is not religious and second generation to immigrants from North Africa, but strong objection from the party's members caused him to reconsider.

## 2.2. Summary statistics

Our dataset contains 262 candidates in the primaries of the 2013 and 2015 elections from the following major Israeli parties: *Likud*, *Bayit Yehudi* and *Labor*.<sup>1</sup> Because our data consist of the candidates for the party elections, we focus on who is elected from the candidates. We do not have data on who decides to be a candidate. Thus the focus is on the possibilities of winning the election within the group of candidates.<sup>2</sup> Our data sources are listed in Appendix A. Table I presents descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables by party. Women make up about half of the Israeli population.<sup>3</sup> We refer to women as a minority group because of their under-representation in the political parties. Some countries have gender quota laws which require all political parties to ensure that women fill a certain percentage of candidate slots (Baldez, 2007). In our dataset, women's weight among the candidates is about a quarter.

About 32% of the Israeli population is old immigrants from Asia–Africa (Mizrahi) and their second and third generations, but their weight among the candidates is about a quarter. About 13% of the Israeli population is new immigrants.<sup>4</sup> However, representation of immigrants among the candidates in the primaries ranges from 4.25% (Labor) to 13.5% (Likud). These immigrants came to Israel from the former USSR, Ethiopia, the US and France.<sup>5</sup> The largest minority group is immigrants from the former Soviet Union, with about 930,000 people. Note that we define a candidate as an (a new) immigrant, an old immigrant from Asia–Africa or religious if he/she can be discerned by the party members according to name, accent, behavior or other external signs (for example, the kippah traditionally worn by religious men) or he/she makes a point of mentioning it during the campaign.

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<sup>1</sup> In the Likud, each party member can choose an additional candidate from his geographical region. However, those candidates are located in low places and most of them are not expected to be elected to parliament. In addition candidates which have previous experience as parliament members cannot be chosen through this track. We do not include these candidates in our analysis

<sup>2</sup> We ignore the selection problem and focus on the winning probability of candidates within groups of given candidates.

<sup>3</sup> The source for the weights of females and new immigrants is the Statistical Abstract of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, 2013).

<sup>4</sup> 1990 marks the beginning of the massive immigration wave from the former USSR to Israel. Hence, we define “new immigrants” as those who have immigrated since 1990. Pre-1990 immigrants are defined as “old immigrants”.

<sup>5</sup> Because of the small number of candidates from each country of origin, we join all of the new immigrants into one group.

About 10% of the population defines itself as religious<sup>6</sup>; more than 13% of the Likud's candidates are religious, in contrast to only about 4% of the Labor's candidates. In the religious party Bayit Yehudi, we refer to the non-religious people as belonging to a minority group. The weight of those candidates in Bayit Yehudi is about 8.5%. Despite of the fact that 9% of Israel's population is ultra-Orthodox, only one candidate among all parties is ultra-Orthodox (this candidate is from the Likud), The reason having one candidate maybe since the ultra-Orthodox voters vote mostly for ultra-religious parties.

More than 20% of Israel's population is not Jewish, mainly Muslims but the group also includes Druze and Christian Arabs. Most of them vote for Arab parties. In the investigated Jewish parties, the weight of the non-Jewish candidates ranges from about 4% (Bayit Yehudi) to about 10% (Labor). The share of the Muslim candidates is lower, and it ranges from about 1% (Likud) to about 5% (Labor). Since the number of the candidates of non-Jewish is small, we join all of the non-Jewish candidates into one group. In addition, most of the Jewish voters do not distinguish between the different sub-groups of the non-Jewish candidates.

Some of the candidates belong to two (or more) minority groups, for example: a female who is also of mizrahi origin, a female new immigrant, etc. thus there are many situation where a candidate can be part of two or more minority groups. The weight of the candidates in the primaries who belong to two minority groups ranges between 8.5% (Labor) and 23% (Likud)<sup>7</sup>.

From table IV, it is easy to see that in some cases the expected share of candidates who belong to two minority groups is similar than the actual share (for example, candidates who are female and religious). In some cases, the expected share differs from the actual like in the case of candidates who are female and non-Jewish or candidates who are female and old immigrants from Asia–Africa (Mizrahi). This may imply that becoming candidate in a primary election is more difficult for minorities, then those who belong to two minorities face a double hurdle, and those making past both are then a more select group.

Between 6% (Labor) and 7% (Likud and Bayit Yehudi) of the candidates served in the army as senior officers or have a military background, whereas between 2% (Likud) and 6% (Labor and Bayit Yehudi) served as a journalist or a new anchor in the national media. More than half of the Likud's candidates in the primaries served as members of Parliament, but only about 20% in the additional other two parties had experience as Parliament members. About 4% of the Likud's candidates and 3% of

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<sup>6</sup> This does not include the ultra-Orthodox. The Israel Social Survey questionnaire uses "religious" as a distinct category, meaning "religious but not haredim". We estimate the weight of the religious group according to the Israel Social Survey.

<sup>7</sup> In appendix A we present the expected share of candidates that belong to two minority groups versus the actual share of the candidate who belong to two minority groups. The expected share is calculated as follows: if the share of the female among the candidates is 26.4% and the share of the old immigrants from Asia–Africa among the candidates is 25.27%, then the expected share of candidates who are female and old immigrants from Asia–Africa is 26.4% multiplied by 25.27%, i.e. 6.67%. There are 22 candidates who are female and old immigrants among 262 candidates, thus, the actual share equals 8.4% which is higher than 6.67%.

Labor's candidates served in the previous term as Parliament members on behalf of another party.

### 2.3. Results

We examined the effect of belonging to a minority group on success in the primaries in two ways. In the first, the independent variable was the candidate's relative success. For the percentile, we used of the position of the candidate relative to the other candidates in his/her party in the same election: the candidates were arranged according to their relative number of votes in the primaries and this was transformed into a percentile.<sup>8</sup> In the second approach, the independent variable was the probability of being elected to the parliament based on surveys conducted close to the time of the primaries. Denote by  $P$  the probability of being in the party list with such a position that the person is expected to be elected to the parliament. In the Likud, about 35% of the candidates were expected to be parliament members, as opposed to less than 25% of the Labor's candidates. This means that candidates with the same relative position, but from different parties, have different probabilities of becoming members of Parliament.

The estimation results from the first approach are presented in Table II, and those from the second approach in Table III. Note that the essential results for both approaches were similar. We examined the different effects of age on each gender. In all of the regressions, age had a negative and significant effect on women's success in the primaries (for both approaches), whereas age had a positive and significant effect on the men's success (second specification only). We also found a significant and positive direct effect of being female in almost all regressions. When we investigated whether men or women had more success in the primaries, we found that until almost 40 years of age, the woman has a better probability of succeeding in the primaries; after that, the man has a higher probability. This might be because young women are perceived as more attractive than older women and this affects the voters. However, an older man is perceived by voters as having more experience than a younger one. The result for women is supported by many studies which have shown a positive relationship between beauty and electoral success (see for example, Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara, 2010, 2017).<sup>9</sup>

New immigrants had a significantly lower relative place and a lower  $P$ . From regressions (1)–(5) in both tables, being an old immigrant from Asia–Africa (Mizrahi) did not have a significant effect on success in the primaries. From regression (6) in Table II, old immigrants from Asia–Africa were more successful in the primaries in the Labor party than natives.<sup>10</sup> However, some of those candidates had been elected to Parliament for the first time via a "reserved place". Non-Jewish candidates had both a lower relative place and lower  $P$ .

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<sup>8</sup> Each party has a different number of voters and the voters choose a different number of candidates. Thus the number of votes and the share of the votes cannot be used as independent variables.

<sup>9</sup> Berggren et al. (2017) distinguished the effect of beauty in low-information and high-information elections in political left and political right, and show that candidates on the right are on average better-looking and that the beauty premium is larger in intraparty competition on the right in low-information elections. Unfortunately we do not have pictures of the candidates to do such an analysis.

<sup>10</sup> We also examined other interactions, such as: New immigrant and Likud, New immigrant and Labor, Non Jewish and Labor, these interactions were not significant.

We did not examine the effect of being religious on the candidates' success in the primaries because most of the religious candidates belong to an additional minority group and this variable is highly correlated with the parties.

Let us now discuss the effect of belonging to two minority groups. Look at regressions (1)–(3) in Table II and regressions (1)–(5) in Table III. Belonging to two minority groups significantly and positively affected a candidate's success in the primaries. In some cases of a candidate belonging to two minority groups, he/she was not only more successful than candidates from one minority group, but also than candidates from the majority. For example, a candidate who is a male, religious and a new immigrant is more successful in the primaries than a male candidate who is non-religious and native. Religious and female candidates will be elected to a higher relative place than a non-religious, male candidate until the age 54 years (by specification (2) in Table II. A female candidate who is also a new immigrant will be elected to a higher relative place than a native male candidate until age 44. She will be more successful than a new immigrant male candidate until age 54.

The 2015 election was announced suddenly, and the primaries were held soon after. Thus, new candidates did not have enough time to get organized for the primaries and advertise themselves, whereas the candidates serving as Parliament members had a great advantage.<sup>11</sup> It is easy to see that the variable of having experience as a member of Parliament significantly and positively affects the candidate's success in the primaries. Adding this variable decreased the significance of the variable "belonging to two minority groups" in the first approach. The effect of this variable is strong. For those being a member of parliament we examined the effect of being part of two minority groups (see Appendix C). In this case, belonging to two minority groups has a positive and significant affect.

We also examined the effect of serving as a member of Parliament in the previous term on behalf of another party. However, we did not find any significant effect, probably because of the small number of observations. Israel is a country with complex security problems and many enemies, and therefore candidates with impressive military backgrounds are sought by all parties. We found that senior officers have a higher relative place than others. We also found that experience as a journalist or a new anchor contributes to the candidate's success in the primaries. This is probably because the candidate is already known when he/she reaches the primaries.

### **3. Discussion**

Immigrants and women experience usually disadvantage in the labor market. Immigrant woman would probably earn less than a native woman and less than an immigrant male (see for example Constant et al. 2006). However, surprisingly, a candidate who belongs to two minority groups can attract party members from the two different groups. In addition, if he (or she) is elected to a position that has a high

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<sup>11</sup> It should be noted that the Likud had the highest number of candidates and had the shorter time between the announcement of elections and the primaries. This may explain the high share of former parliament members in the final list.



chance of getting into Parliament, the party can "kill two birds with one stone" by being attractive to two different minority groups whose voting rate is usually higher than that of the majority group (see Herron and Sekhon, 2005). Candidates who belong to double minority groups might be supported by the party leaders, who foresee their electoral potential. In addition, it may be a result of self-selection of the candidates who belong to two minority group. Thus those candidates have exceptional abilities and as such do not represent the abilities of the rest members who belong to two minority group. However, the weight of minority groups, mainly new immigrants, non-Jewish and religious individuals (or non-religious ones in a religious party) among party members is relatively low, and therefore the support that a candidate can receive from them is limited. Candidates from minority groups, mainly new immigrants and non-Jewish, lack language skills, the networks of the more established party members and resources. Thus, the effect of belonging to two minority groups is ambiguous.

In this paper, we found robust evidence for a positive effect of belonging to two minority groups on the candidate's success in the primaries. In some cases in which the candidate belonged to two minority groups, he/she was more successful not only than a candidate from one minority group, but also than a candidate from the majority. For example, a candidate who is a male, religious and a new immigrant will be more successful in the primaries than a male candidate who is non-religious and native. However, candidates who belong to one minority group, such as new immigrants or non-Jews, have a lower probability of winning.

Our results support recent articles in which ethnic minority women were found to outnumber ethnic minority men in national parliaments (Bird, 2003, Celis et al., 2014; Dancygier et al., 2015; Hughes, 2016). Our analysis allows examining not only the effect of being an ethnic woman but also that of being a religious woman or ethnic man. It would be interesting, in a future study, to examine whether the representation of minority groups in political parties affects the election outcome, or if minority group members vote for sectoral parties anyway. It would also be interesting to investigate whether the effect of one candidate belonging to two minority groups is similar to that of two candidates from two different minority groups.

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**Table I: Explanatory variables and descriptive statistics**

	Likud	Bayit Yehudi	Labor	Share of Jewish population
Age (std. dev.)	50.72 (11.81)	48.60 (10.34)	50.55 (11.07)	-
Female (%)	26.04	25.00	27.12	50.45
Old immigrants from Asia–Africa (Mizrahi) (%)	26.04	29.17	23.73	31.7
New immigrant- all source country (%)	13.54	8.33	4.25	12.68
Immigrants from Ethiopia	5.21	2.08	0.85	1.6
Religious (or non-religious in a religious party) (%)	19.79	8.33	1.67	9.42
Ultra-ortodox	1.04	0	0	9.0
Non-Jewish" (Including Muslims, Druze and Arab Christians) (%)	6.25	4.17	10.17	21.10
Muslims	1.04	2.08	5.08	17.7
Belonging to two or more minority groups (%)	22.92	12.5	8.47	-
Senior (military) officer (%)	8.33	8.33	6.78	-
Journalists or new anchor (%)	2.08	6.25	5.93	-
Candidate is expected to be elected to the parliament (%)	36.46	29.17	24.58	-
Experience as member of Parliament (%)	51.04	18.75	20.51	-
Served as member of Parliament on behalf of another party (%)	4.17%	3.39%	0%	
Number of observations	96	48	118	-

**Table II: Relative position of the candidate**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.20 (0.16)	0.48*** (0.17)	0.29 (1.62)	-0.00 (0.15)	-0.11 (0.15)	-0.15 (0.15)
Age* Female	-	-1.25*** (0.37)	-0.99*** (0.36)	-0.88*** (0.31)	-0.73** (0.31)	-0.73** (0.30)
Female	-8.7 (4.72)	51.48** (2.78)	39.17** (17.95)	37.36** (15.56)	30.08* (15.33)	30.13** (15.17)
Old immigrants from Asia–Africa (Mizrahi)	-1.89 (4.68)	-2.26 (4.59)	-1.28 (4.40)	-1.19 (3.84)	-0.60 (3.76)	-7.72* (4.57)
Mizrahi* Labor	-					15.26*** (5.67)
New immigrant	-12.94* (7.42)	-12.32* (7.27)	-9.07 (7.01)	-11.07* (6.09)	-8.96 (5.98)	-10.24* (5.93)
Non-Jewish	-13.39** (6.77)	-13.73** (6.64)	-12.16* (6.39)	-9.40* (5.58)	-8.55 (5.46)	-8.46 (5.40)
Belonging to two or more minority groups	16.60** (6.71)	16.07** (6.58)	14.80** (6.32)	7.92 (5.58)	7.54 (5.44)	9.38* (5.42)
Experience as member of Parliament				34.37*** (3.28)	32.04*** (3.27)	33.03*** (3.25)
Senior (military) officer			21.21*** (6.53)		15.44*** (5.93)	14.85*** (5.52)
Journalist or new anchor			30.95*** (7.93)		19.10*** (6.87)	18.94*** (6.79)
Constant	43.78 (8.83)	29.27** (9.67)	35.83** (9.460)	43.09*** (8.23)	46.82 (8.16)	48.94*** (8.08)
F	2.25	3.62	5.71	18.18	16.63	16.15
R-squared	0.05	0.09	0.16	0.36	0.39	0.41
Number of observations	262	262	262	262	262	262

Notes:

1. Standard deviation values are denoted in parentheses.
2. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.

**Table III: Probability that the candidate is expected to be elected to the parliament**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age	0.019 (0.012)	0.038*** (0.014)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.031 (0.021)
Age* Female	-	-0.098*** (0.035)	-0.088** (0.04)	-0.090** (0.041)	-0.086* (0.048)
Female	-0.826** (0.411)	3.760** (1.639)	3.106* (1.831)	3.491* (1.944)	3.217 (2.166)
Old immigrants from Asia–Africa (Mizrahi)	-0.118 (0.360)	-0.139 (0.364)	0.008 (0.391)	-0.108 (0.452)	0.052 (0.477)
New immigrant	-1.457** (0.713)	-1.514** (0.734)	-1.169 (0.746)	-2.009** (0.875)	-1.754* (0.904)
Non-Jewish	-2.412** (1.046)	-2.403** (1.04)	-2.806** (1.188)	-2.674** (1.122)	-2.426** (1.110)
Belonging to two or more minority groups	1.385** (0.557)	1.422** (0.577)	1.454** (0.615)	1.126* (0.682)	1.272* (0.737)
Experience as member of Parliament				3.114*** (0.400)	3.327*** (0.461)
Senior (military) officer			2.434*** (0.639)		3.055*** (0.788)
Journalist or new anchor			3.274*** (0.912)		3.463*** (1.109)
Constant	-1.636** (0.711)	-2.592*** (0.817)	-1.911** (0.859)	-1.552 (0.989)	-0.808 (1.039)
LR chi2	21.87	30.24	65.50	111.16	139.43
Pseudo R-squared	0.068	0.094	0.205	0.348	0.437
Number of observations	262	262	262	262	262

Notes:

1. Standard deviation values are denoted in parentheses.
2. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.

## Appendix A - data resources:

- The Knesset homepage: <http://knesset.gov.il/main/eng/home.asp>
- Likud's homepage: <https://likud.org.il/>
- Labor's homepage: <http://www.hamahanehazioni.co.il/usorhim/>
- Bayit Yehudi's homepage: <http://www.baityehudi.org.il/>
- <http://www.inn.co.il/Special/Elections/AllCandidate.aspx>
- <https://likud.org.il/likud-youth/%D7%90%D7%95%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%A6%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%93>
- <http://www.kipa.co.il/now/50066.html>
- <https://observpost.wordpress.com/2015/01/07/primary-election-15/>
- <http://www.blacklabor.org/?p=49884>
- The candidates' Facebook and home pages

## Appendix B

**Table IV: The expected share of candidate who belong to two minority groups versus the actual share**

	Expected share	The actual share
Candidates who are female and old immigrants from Asia–Africa (Mizrahi)	6.67%	8.40%
Candidates who are female and new immigrant	2.22%	1.53%
Candidates who are female and religious	2.52%	2.67%
Candidates who are female and non-Jewish	2.01%	0.76%
Candidates who are religious male and old immigrants from Asia–Africa	1.77%	1.15%
Candidates who are religious male and new immigrants	0.59%	2.67%

## Appendix C

**Table V: Relative position of the candidate who had experience as member in the parliament.**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	-0.438* (0.239)	-0.408 (0.265)	-0.513* (0.279)
Age* Female		-0.160 (0.593)	0.046 (0.605)
Female	-17.035** (7.232)	-8.743 (31.464)	-20.617 (32.287)
Old immigrants from Asia–Africa (Mizrahi)	-3.412 (5.864)	-3.556 (5.925)	-2.938 (5.912)
New immigrant	-22.369** (5.864)	-21.885** (10.554)	-19.651* (10.620)
Non-Jewish	-17.333* (9.580)	-17.057* (9.693)	-14.348 (9.816)
Belonging to two or more minority groups	16.807* (8.747)	16.301* (8.998)	15.957* (9.05)
Senior (military) officer			8.655 (6.899)
journalist or new anchor			9.708 (8.016)
Constant	104.209*** (14.388)	102.504*** (15.787)	106.015*** (16.185)
F	2.08	1.77	1.68
R-squared	0.142	0.143	0.173
Number of observations	82	82	82