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| Masaaki Yoshimori |
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| ''Deterrence, disruption, and nonlinear price dynamics at energy chokepoints'' |
| ( 2026, Vol. 0 No.0 ) |
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| This paper develops a tractable sequential game of strategic interaction at critical maritime energy chokepoints, where geographic asymmetries generate disproportionate effects on global oil prices. We model a sequential game between a challenger and an incumbent in which oil prices are determined endogenously by a nonlinear function of disruption and deterrence. The interaction between diminishing returns to deterrence and convex deterrence costs generates threshold equilibria with three possible outcomes: effective deterrence, active disruption, and an intermediate regime in which disruption persists despite positive deterrence. The intermediate equilibrium provides a theoretical explanation for sustained price pressure and incomplete stabilization during periods of geopolitical tension. More broadly, the framework helps explain nonlinear oil price responses to geopolitical shocks and provides a tractable theoretical foundation for future empirical research on energy market dynamics. |
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| Keywords: |
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Sep 23 2026 | | Manuscript Accepted : Oct 10 2026 |
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