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| Yasuhito Tanaka |
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| ''Strategy-proofness of social choice functions and non-negative association property with continuous preferences'' |
| ( 2002, Vol. 4 No.8 ) |
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| We consider the relation between strategy-proofness of resolute (single-valued) social choice functions and its property which we call Non-negative association property (NNAP) when individual preferences over infinite number of alternatives are continuous, and the set of alternatives is a metric space. NNAP is a weaker version of Strong positive association property (SPAP) of Muller and Satterthwaite(1977). Barbera and Peleg(1990) showed that strategy-proofness of resolute social choice functions implies Modified strong positive association property (MSPAP). But MSPAP is not equivalent to strategy-proofness. We shall show that strategy-proofness and NNAP are equivalent for resolute social choice functions with continuous preferences. |
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| Keywords: continuous preferences |
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
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| Manuscript Received : Mar 08 2002 | | Manuscript Accepted : Mar 18 2002 |
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