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Christian Klamler
 
''A comparison of the Dodgson method and the Copeland rule''
( 2003, Vol. 4 No.8 )
 
 
This paper compares binary versions of two well-known preference aggregation methods designed to overcome problems occurring from voting cycles, Copeland's (1951) and Dodgson''s (1876) method. In particular it will first be shown that the Copeland winner can occur at any position in the Dodgson ranking. Second, it will be proved that for some list of individual preferences over the set of alternatives, the Dodgson ranking and the Copeland ranking will be exactly the opposite, i.e. maximally different.
 
 
Keywords: Copeland Rule
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
 
Manuscript Received : Oct 24 2002 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 07 2003

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