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ralph lauren polo

Ronald Wendner
''Status, environmental externality, and optimal tax programs''
( 2003, Vol. 8 No.5 )
This paper studies the designs of optimal tax programs in OLG economies when first, consumption of one household lowers (status) utility of others, and second, consumption harms the environment. Status seeking raises optimal consumption tax rates, and lowers optimal tax rates on capital income.
Keywords: consumption tax
JEL: H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
D1 - Household Behavior: General
Manuscript Received : Jan 04 2003 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 30 2003

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