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| Massimo A. De Francesco |
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| ''On a property of mixed strategy equilibria of the pricing game'' |
| ( 2003, Vol. 4 No.30 ) |
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| Before solving a two-stage capacity and pricing game for oligopoly, Boccard and Wauthy (2000) argue that, as under duopoly, at a mixed strategy equilibrium of the pricing game the largest firm's expected profit is the profit accruing to it as a Stackelberg follower when the rivals supply their entire capacity. We point to a serious mistake in their argument and then we see how this important property can be satisfactorily established. |
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| Keywords: Bertrand competition |
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
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| Manuscript Received : Jul 23 2003 | | Manuscript Accepted : Sep 19 2003 |
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