|
| |
| Bart Capéau and Erwin Ooghe |
| |
| ''Merit goods and phantom agents'' |
| ( 2003, Vol. 8 No.8 ) |
| |
| |
| Besley (1988) is one of the few exceptional articles containing non-welfarist optimal tax devices. Feehan (1990) reports an error in his first-best rules. The present note argues that Besley's second-best rules optimize the welfare of phantom agents rather than the corrected welfare of real existing agents in society. |
| |
| |
| Keywords: merit goods |
JEL: H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
I3 - Welfare and Poverty: General |
| |
| Manuscript Received : Jul 01 2003 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jul 01 2003 |
|
