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| Alexander Zimper |
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| ''Equivalence between best responses and undominated strategies: a generalization from finite to compact strategy sets.'' |
| ( 2005, Vol. 3 No.7 ) |
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| For games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are finite, Pearce (1984) shows that a strategy is strictly dominated by some mixed strategy, if and only if, this strategy is not a best response to some belief about opponents' strategy choice. This note generalizes Pearce''s (1984) equivalence result to games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are arbitrary compact sets. |
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| Manuscript Received : Sep 23 2004 | | Manuscript Accepted : Feb 19 2005 |
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