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Montserrat Ferré
''Multilateral surveillance in the Stability and Growth Pact: an analysis through information sharing''
( 2004, Vol. 5 No.15 )
In this article we use the concept of information sharing from oligopolistic games to analyse the multilateral surveillance of budget positions introduced with the Stability and Growth Pact. In a game between one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities, we will show that the multilateral surveillance does not lead to closer to target average budget deficits compared to a benchmark case of no surveillance.
JEL: E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General
H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
Manuscript Received : Apr 29 2004 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 07 2004

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