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Junichiro Ishida
 
''Education as advertisement''
( 2004, Vol. 10 No.8 )
 
 
The paper perceives education as a type of money burning activity, much like advertisement, and examines its effect on social welfare. In a model where the employer's job assignment also functions as a signal a la Waldman (1984), there exists a separating equilibrium in which education credibly conveys information even when the single-crossing property fails to hold. Moreover, we also show that education as advertisement can actually be welfare-improving. This result indicates that education can be meaningful and even socially desirable even if its sole role is simply to waste resources.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL:
D6 - Welfare Economics: General
 
Manuscript Received : Sep 08 2004 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 10 2004

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