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ralph lauren polo

John Roemer
''Games with vector-valued payoffs and their application to competition between organizations''
( 2005, Vol. 3 No.16 )
In 1959, Lloyd Shapley wrote a short paper on games with vector payoffs. He analyzed zero-sum matrix games. Here, we extend Shapley's equilibrium concept to general games with vector payoffs, introduce an organizational interpretation of the concept, elaborate the relationship of the original concept to another equilibrium concept where each player can be viewed as running a bargaining game among internal ‘factions,'' and finally comment upon its relationship to the concept of party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE).
Manuscript Received : Mar 21 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 25 2005

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