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Jason Taylor and Christopher Bailey
''Preferences for Government Size and their Effect on Labor-Leisure Decisions''
( 2005, Vol. 8 No.5 )
While many economists have theorized and/or empirically demonstrated that labor-leisure decisions are influenced by the rate of taxation, this note introduces a new mechanism in which the collecting of taxes on income may affect such decisions. Although standard models assume that agents have no preference for the size and scope of government activity, recent and past political rhetoric suggests that preferences do exist. We examine how labor-leisure decisions can be affected when taxes are derived from income and agents' utility functions include a preference for government size.
JEL: H1 - Structure and Scope of Government: General
J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor: General
Manuscript Received : Mar 07 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 20 2005

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