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| Wojciech Olszewski |
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| ''A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games'' |
| ( 2007, Vol. 3 No.58 ) |
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| Recently, there has been made a substantial progress in the analysis of repeated games with private monitoring. This progress began with introducing a new class of sequential equilibrium strategies, called belief-free equilibria, that can be analyzed using recursive techniques. The purpose of this paper is to explain the general method of constructing belief-free equilibria, and the limit (or bound) on the set of payoff vectors that can be achieved in these strategies in a way that should be easily accessible, even for those who do not pretend to be experts in repeated games. |
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| Manuscript Received : Nov 08 2007 | | Manuscript Accepted : Nov 12 2007 |
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