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Giorgos Stamatopoulos
''On the possibility of licensing in a market with logit demand functions''
( 2008, Vol. 4 No.17 )
We analyze the incentives for technology transfer between two firms in a market characterized by a logit demand framework. The available licensing policies of the incumbent innovator are the up front fee, royalty and two-part tariff policies. We show that when the market is covered there is no equilibrium where technology transfer occurs.
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Manuscript Received : Dec 15 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 13 2008

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