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Nicolas Houy
''A new characterization of absolute qualified majority voting''
( 2007, Vol. 4 No.4 )
We show that the class of absolute qualified majority voting rules are the only ones to satisfy Anonymity, Neutrality, Monotonicity, Weak Pareto and Decisiveness Non-Equivalence. When there are two alternatives x and y, the latter axiom states that if an individual voting for y can improve the result of x by abstaining, then it is not the case that an individual abstaining can improve the result of x by voting for x.
Keywords: Absolute Qualified Majority Voting.
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Manuscript Received : Feb 14 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 15 2007

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