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| Stefano Colombo |
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| ''Firms' symmetry and sustainability of collusion in a Hotelling duopoly'' |
| ( 2009, Vol. 29 No.1 ) |
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| We use a differentiated duopoly a la Hotelling to assess the impact of firms' symmetry on the sustainability of a tacit collusive agreement. We obtain that the smaller firm has the greater incentive to deviate and that symmetry helps collusion for any possible differentiation degree. |
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| Keywords: |
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Sep 12 2008 | | Manuscript Accepted : Mar 13 2009 |
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