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ralph lauren polo

Stefano Colombo
''Firms' symmetry and sustainability of collusion in a Hotelling duopoly''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.1 )
We use a differentiated duopoly a la Hotelling to assess the impact of firms' symmetry on the sustainability of a tacit collusive agreement. We obtain that the smaller firm has the greater incentive to deviate and that symmetry helps collusion for any possible differentiation degree.
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Manuscript Received : Sep 12 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 13 2009

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