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Angelo Antoci, Paolo Russu and Luca Zarri
''Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations''
( 2010, Vol. 30 No.1 )
Experimental evidence indicates that free riders and strongly reciprocal papers coexist in the public goods game framework. By means of an evolutionary analysis, we provide an endogenization of this behavioral regularity.
Keywords: Free Riding, Cooperation, Strong Reciprocity, Public Goods Game, Evolutionary Game Theory.
Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology: General
Manuscript Received : Aug 30 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 11 2010

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