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Ludovic A. Julien and Fabrice Tricou
''Preferences, market power and oligopolistic competition: an example''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.4 )
This paper studies the way market power operates under symmetric oligopoly equilibrium. Stressing the role of preferences and focusing on price manipulation, four results are obtained about asymptotic identifications (for degenerate preferences and large economies) and about welfare configurations.
Keywords: Pure exchange, strategic interactions
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
D5 - Computable General Equilibrium
Manuscript Received : Nov 03 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 23 2009

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