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Oriol Tejada
''A note on competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets''
( 2010, Vol. 30 No.1 )
A multilateral assignment market with buyers and a number of different types of firms can be modeled by a multi-sided assignment game. We prove that core allocations of the latter are in a one-to-one correspondence with competitive prices of the former, where the notion of competitive price extends that of Roth and Sotomayor (1990). This result generalizes to multi-sided assignment markets the characterization of competitive prices known for the two-sided case.
Keywords: Assignment games, multi-sided markets, competitive prices, core
Manuscript Received : Nov 12 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 05 2010

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