|
| |
| Stefano Colombo |
| |
| ''A note on information of firms and collusion'' |
| ( 2010, Vol. 30 No.2 ) |
| |
| |
| We study the effect of more information of firms about consumers' preferences on collusion sustainability within a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. We show that the increase of information may increase or decrease collusion sustainability, depending on the type of information involved (shared information or unshared information), on the characteristics of the information distribution, and on the product differentiation degree. |
| |
| |
| Keywords: Tacit collusion; Information; Horizontal differentiation; Hotelling |
JEL: L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
|
| |
| Manuscript Received : May 05 2010 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jun 02 2010 |
|
