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| Jérôme Serais |
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| ''Manipulation of the Borda rule by introduction of a similar candidate'' |
| ( 2011, Vol. 31 No.1 ) |
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| In an election contest, a losing candidate a can manipulate the election outcome in his favor by introducing a weak similar candidate WSC in the choice set, the WSC b being defined as an alternative which is ranked immediatly below a in the individual preferences. We characterize the voting situations where this manipulation is efficient for the Borda rule and express its vulnerability for a 3 alternative election. |
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| Keywords: Borda rule, Manipulation, Strategic candidacy, Similar candidate |
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
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| Manuscript Received : Feb 04 2011 | | Manuscript Accepted : Mar 02 2011 |
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