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| Claudine Desrieux and Jean Beuve |
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| ''Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness'' |
| ( 2011, Vol. 31 No.3 ) |
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| Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts. |
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| Keywords: Contractual incompleteness, Relational Contract, Reputation, Repeated Games |
JEL: L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
D2 - Production and Organizations: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Mar 27 2011 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jul 08 2011 |
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