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| Jeremy J Jackson |
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| ''A legislative bargaining approach to earmarked public expenditures'' |
| ( 2011, Vol. 31 No.3 ) |
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| This paper develops a model of legislative spending in
which revenues can be spent through earmarks or a general fund. Legislative choice is modeled as a Baron and Ferejohn style
legislative bargaining game. The novel approach is to model the
bargaining process as a two-stage game reflecting the reality that
earmarked expenditures precede general fund appropriations. This drives the result that all revenue is spent by way of earmarking leaving no revenue in the general fund. |
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| Keywords: Earmarking, legislative bargaining, public goods. |
JEL: H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Apr 29 2011 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jul 06 2011 |
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