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Stefano Colombo
''Spatially asymmetric firms and the sustainability of a price agreement''
( 2011, Vol. 31 No.3 )
We study collusion between price discriminating firms which are asymmetrically located in a linear city. We obtain that higher distance increases the sustainability of the collusive agreement for any degree of spatial asymmetry, and more spatial symmetry between firms increases collusion sustainability whatever is the location of the firms in the space, both assuming grim-trigger and optimal punishment.
Keywords: Collusion; Spatial asymmetry.
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
Manuscript Received : May 04 2011 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 26 2011

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