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| Doruk İriş and İpek Özkal-Sanver |
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| ''Manilulation via endowments in university-admission problem'' |
| ( 2011, Vol. 31 No.4 ) |
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| We consider a two-sided many-to-one matching model where universities offer scholarships to students. We show that every stable matching rule is manipulable by a university via destroying endowments under a fairly wide class of scholarship rules. Furthermore, we show that the set of Nash equilibria of the destruction game and the set of stable matchings may be disjoint. |
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| Keywords: University-admission problem, Endowments, Manipulation |
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| Manuscript Received : Jul 29 2011 | | Manuscript Accepted : Oct 19 2011 |
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