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Doruk İriş and İpek Özkal-Sanver
''Manilulation via endowments in university-admission problem''
( 2011, Vol. 31 No.4 )
We consider a two-sided many-to-one matching model where universities offer scholarships to students. We show that every stable matching rule is manipulable by a university via destroying endowments under a fairly wide class of scholarship rules. Furthermore, we show that the set of Nash equilibria of the destruction game and the set of stable matchings may be disjoint.
Keywords: University-admission problem, Endowments, Manipulation
Manuscript Received : Jul 29 2011 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 19 2011

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