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Francisco Martínez-sánchez
''Collusion in Software Markets''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.2 )
In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on prices in software markets. We show that network externality hinders collusion. We also show that firms collude if they value future profits sufficiently.
Keywords: Collusion, Network Externality, Software Market
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Manuscript Received : Sep 21 2011 Manuscript Accepted : May 07 2012

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