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Emilie Dargaud
''Endogenous mergers and maximal concentration: a note''
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.1 )
This article examines the incentive to merge in a Bertrand competition model with generalized substitutability and price competition. The model suggests that acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in maximal concentration of the industry.
Keywords: endogenous mergers, concentration, price competition
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Manuscript Received : Oct 25 2011 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 13 2012

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