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Shumei Hirai |
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''Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Contests with Endogenous Prizes'' |
( 2012, Vol. 32 No.4 ) |
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This paper considers a contest with an endogenous prize, which is increasing in aggregate efforts of the players. Each player may have a different valuation of the prize and a different ability to convert expenditures to productive efforts. Under standard assumptions in the literature, we prove that there exists a unique pure Nash equilibrium in asymmetric contests with endogenous prizes. |
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Keywords: Contests, Endogenous prize, Existence and uniqueness |
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
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Manuscript Received : Aug 03 2012 | | Manuscript Accepted : Oct 05 2012 |
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