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| Daniel Cardona and Clara Ponsatí |
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| ''Super-majorites and collective surplus in one-dimensional bargaining: Numerical simulations'' |
| ( 2013, Vol. 33 No.1 ) |
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| This note presents numerical simulations computing quota rules that maximize collective surplus for populations choosing a one-dimensional policy through bargaining and voting. These computations are based on the characterization of the unique (asymptotic) equilibrium of Cardona and Ponsatí (2011). We show that under quadratic utility functions, the unique quota rule that maximizes collective surplus ranges from 80% to 95%. |
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| Keywords: One-dimensional bargaining, single-peak preferences, quota rules, collective surplus. |
JEL:
D6 - Welfare Economics: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Oct 19 2012 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jan 30 2013 |
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