|
| |
| Katsuhiko Nishizaki |
| |
| ''An impossibility theorem for secure implementation in discrete public good economies'' |
| ( 2013, Vol. 33 No.1 ) |
| |
| |
| This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjostrom, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in discrete public good economies with quasi-linear preferences. We find that only constant social choice functions are securely implementable over the domains that satisfy partial dominance introduced in this paper. Partial dominance is a reasonable condition because the set of all strictly increasing and strictly concave valuation functions satisfies this condition. |
| |
| |
| Keywords: Secure implementation, Dominant strategy implementation, Nash implementation, Strategy-proofness, Discrete public good |
JEL: H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
|
| |
| Manuscript Received : Nov 09 2012 | | Manuscript Accepted : Feb 07 2013 |
|
