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| Emmanuelle Taugourdeau and Jean-pierre Vidal |
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| ''The tax competition game revisited: When leadership may be optimal'' |
| ( 2014, Vol. 34 No.1 ) |
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| In this paper, we investigate the impact of leadership in a tax competition game. We show that leadership by a group of countries is pareto improving for each country (leaders and followers) compared to a Nash equilibrium outcome. In addition, a coalition of leaders is also pareto improving and this coalition is stable. |
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| Keywords: Tax competition, Leadership, Strategic interactions |
JEL: H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Sep 09 2013 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jan 14 2014 |
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