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ralph lauren polo

Duozhe Li
''Multiplicity of Equilibrium Payoffs in Three-Player Baron-Ferejohn Model''
( 2014, Vol. 34 No.2 )
This paper studies the three-player sequential bargaining game with a simple majority voting rule due to Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We show that there is a vast multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs, and that as the discount factor tends to one, the set of equilibrium payoffs evolves monotonically towards the entire feasible set. The multiplicity result can be easily extended to an interesting variant of the bargaining game, in which the responders only observe their own offers.
Keywords: Multilateral Bargaining; Majority Voting; Multiple Equilibria
Manuscript Received : Nov 19 2013 Manuscript Accepted : May 25 2014

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