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Dan Qin
''Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: a note''
( 2014, Vol. 34 No.2 )
To examine the consequences of allowing individual to violate full rationality in collective decision making, this article discusses the possibility of aggregating quasi-transitive preferences in the Arrovian framework. Quasi-transitive valued aggregating functions are discussed and characterised. A characterisation of the weak Pareto extension rule is also achieved as a corollary.
Keywords: preference aggregation, quasi-transitivity, veto power, Weak Pareto extension rule
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Manuscript Received : Dec 18 2013 Manuscript Accepted : May 08 2014

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