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Adolfo Cristobal Campoamor |
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''Job competition, employability and incentives for human capital formation'' |
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.1 ) |
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This note describes the effects on human capital formation of rank-order tournaments offering identical prizes to a given number of the ranked contestants. This compensation scheme is thought to resemble the selection processes in different areas of the public administration, particularly in Southern European countries. In the presence of contestants with identical ability, the incentives for educational effort are highest when the variance of fi
nal returns is maximized. |
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Keywords: human capital, tournaments, imperfect information, public sector, contests |
JEL: M5 - Personnel Economics: General |
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Manuscript Received : Dec 17 2014 | | Manuscript Accepted : Mar 12 2015 |
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