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ralph lauren polo

Hironori Otsubo
''Nash Equilibria in a Two-Person Discrete All-Pay Auction with Unfair Tie-Break and Complete Information''
( 2015, Vol. 35 No.4 )
This note provides a full characterization of the set of Nash equilibria in the two-person all-pay auction with discrete strategy space and complete information where bidders are treated differently in case of a tie. There exist a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium and a continuum of asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. In some of these equilibria the bidder who loses in case of a tie is more likely to win the prize than the bidder who wins in case of a tie.
Keywords: All-pay auction, Complete information, Discrete strategy space, Unfair tie-breaking rule
Manuscript Received : Sep 09 2015 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 21 2015

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