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Hatem Smaoui, Dominique Lepelley and Issofa Moyouwou
''Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections''
( 2016, Vol. 36 No.3 )
We derive analytical representations for the vulnerability of Borda Elimination Rule (BER) to Monotonicity Paradoxes. These results allow to compare BER vulnerability with that of Plurality Elimination Rule (or Plurality Runoff) and Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (or Coombs Rule), that suffer from the same pathologies. We show that BER performs better than these two rules at avoiding monotonicity failures. The probability model on which our results are based is the Impartial Anonymous Culture condition, often used in this kind of study.
Keywords: Group decisions - Voting rules - Scoring Elimination Rules - Monotonicity failure
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Manuscript Received : Aug 15 2016 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 11 2016

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