All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Pauli Lappi
''Too many traders? On the welfare ranking of prices and quantities''
( 2017, Vol. 37 No.3 )
This study conducts a welfare comparison of emission tax and emissions trading in a multi-period model, in which the regulation instruments are chosen through a political process and unregulated participants can trade in the permit market. It is found that under reasonable conditions a tax yields a higher welfare level than emissions trading.
Keywords: Emissions trading, Emission tax, Lobbying, Welfare
JEL: Q5 - Environmental Economics: General
Manuscript Received : Mar 20 2017 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 31 2017

  This abstract has been downloaded 1057 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 151997 times